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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

DON S. SMITH and BRIGHAM H. SMITH,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
R. L. WARR,
Defendant and Crosscomplainant and Appellant,

Case No. 14565

vs.
J. H. EHLERS, EVELYN P. BOYCE,
LOIS P. CONNELL,
Defendants and Crossdefendants and Respondents

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT J. H. EHLERS

NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant appeals from a judgment in his favor and
against Respondents based on a breach of two (2) real estate
contracts.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant's cross-complaint against Respondents was tried
without jury before the Honorable James S, Sawaya on January 16,
1976, at which time the lower court denied the Appellant's claim
for damages based on benefit of the bargain theory and limited

recovery to Appellant's out-of-pocket loss and denied
Appellant's request for attorney!s fees and costs of court.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent, J. H. Ehlers, asks

the court to affirm

the judgment of the trial court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent, J. H. Ehlers, agrees with the statement
of facts set forth in the Appellant's brief, except as follows
and with the following additions.
Exceptions:
1.

Appellant, R. L. Warr, never made a tender to

the Respondents of the balance due on the contracts and never made
application with a bank or lending institution to obtain the
necessary money to pay off the contracts,

(R 279)

Whether the

Appellant was "prepared" to pay the remaining amount due under the
contracts, as the Appellant's brief claims, is seriously questionable.

(R 276)
Additions:
1.

Appellant, R. L. Warr, had actual and construct-

ive knowledge and notice of the adverse claims of the Plaintiffs
in the principal action from the time of the execution of the real
estate contracts.

The Appellant was on the property prior to the

execution of the real estate contract in August, 1973.

(R 276)

Although Appellant's brief states that the Appellant did not know
-2-

that a lawsuit had been filed until June 16, 1975, the Appellant
talked with Utah Title Insurance Company in the summer of 1974
and was informed that there was a possibility of a lawsuit on the
property.

(R 274)

Furthermore, Appellant, R. L. Warr, said that

one reason he did not attempt to take possession of the property
in August, 1973, was because he was trying to stay out of trouble.
(R 281)

Appellant, R. L. Warr, also testified that he made no

effort to find out who was using the land between the contract date
and the first year.

(R 281)

Appellant testified at the trial that

he made such an effort the following year after purchasing the
property, approximately in the spring of 1974, and discovered that
it was being farmed by a tenant of a party claiming to own it,
namely, the Plaintiffs in the principal action.
2.

(R 282)

The Respondent, J. H. Ehlers, through his

attorney, offered to refund the monies paid by the Appellant,
R. L. Warr.

(R 285)
3.

Respondents secured a Preliminary Title Report

from Utah Title Insurance Company, showing clear title in them at
the time of the execution of the real estate contracts.

(R 264 and

265)
ARGUMENT
POINT I
APPELLANT FAILED TO STATE A CLAIM IN THE LOWER
COURT BECAUSE OF APPELLANT'S FAILURE TO TENDER
THE BALANCE DUE UNDER THE REAL ESTATE CONTRACTS.
The closest thing that the Appellant did toward paying
-3-

off the contract was allegedly asking his father to loan him
the money.

(R 275 and 275)

The money was never loaned to the

Appellant by his father and there is no proof that sufficient
amount was available.
lending institution.

There was no application to a bank or
(R 279)

Admittedly, there was no tender

of the balance due on the contracts from the Appellant to the
Respondent.

That such is required is clear from the Supreme

Court of Utah case of Woodard vs. Allen, 265 P2d 398 (1953).
In that case, it was held that the seller was not obliged to
prove marketable title simply because the Defendant raised the
point in a case where there was a real estate sale on contract
and where the buyer had not tendered the full purchase price.
The trial court had found that the seller had no marketable title
and, hence, no right to relief.

On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court

said in effect that the marketablity of the seller's title was
immaterial until the contract had been paid.

As in the Woodard

case, Warr's demand for a good warranty deed is premature.
Under the very terms of the Uniform Real Estate Contract:
itself, it provides as follows in paragraph 19:
"The seller on receiving the payments herein reserved
to be paid at the time and in the manner above mentioned agrees to
execute and deliver to the buyer or assigns, a good and sufficient
warranty deed conveying the title to the above described premises
free and clear of all encumbrances except as herein mentioned and
except as may have accrued by or through the acts or neglect of the
buyer and to furnish at his expense, a policy of title insurance in
the amount of the purchase price or at the option of the seller, an
abstract brought to date at the time of sale or at any time during
the term of this agreement or at time of delivery of deed, at the
option of the buyer," (emphasis added)
-4-

The payments were never "received".
A mere offer to pay does not constitute a valid tender,
the law requires that the tenderer have the money present and
ready and produce and actually offer it to the other party.

See

74 Am Jur 2d 549, Tender §7, citing Talty vs. Freedmanfs Sav. and
T. Company, 93 US 321; Somerton State Bank vs. Maxey, 197 P 892;
Rosencrans vs. Fry, 95 A2d 905; St. Georges Soc. vs. Sawyer, 214
NW 877; Louisville and N.R. Co. vs. Cottengim, 104 SW 280.
Until there has been a tender of the purchase price,
the vendee1 s remedy is recission of the contract due to the vendor's
inability to convey marketable title, together with a refund of
monies paid.

Actually, there was a mutual mistake of fact by

both parties at the time of the execution of the contract.

At

that time, the contract seller had lost title by adverse possession
since the taxes had been paid and the possession maintained for
seven (7) years prior to the execution of the contract.

Under the

terms of the real estate contract, the contract seller, J. H.
Ehlers, and the others, were obligated to give the buyer possession
at that time.

Because they had lost the property by adverse

possession prior to that time, they were unable to so do and
therefore the breach occurred at that time.

Since the damages are

to be measured as of the date of the breach, assuming the Appellant
has a cause of action, it occurred when the sellers were unable
to give possession.

At that time, the fair market value of the

property was the same as the contract price (R 277) and therefore
-5-

a refund of the contract payments would be the same as
compensating the buyer in the amount of the fair market value.
If the breach is considered to be as of the date that the seller
was unable to give a warranty deed, then it is impossible to
determine damages because that obligation to so produce a warranty
deed does not arise until tender of the entire purchase price.
On the other hand, if the contract purchaser were to
tender the balance of the purchase price, then the contract
seller, J. H. Ehlers, would be required to give the purchaser
a warranty deed and would be in breach of the warranties implied
therein as set forth in §57-1-12, Utah Code Annotated, as amended
1953.

The measure of damages for breach of such warranties is

set forth in 20 Am Jur 2d 691, Covenants, Conditions and
Restrictions, §155.

It states as follows:

"The damages recoverable by the grantee for total breach
of a covenant of title cannot, as a general rule, be augmented by
an increase in the value of the land conveyed. This rule applies
to covenants of seisin, of warranty, and for quiet enjoyment, and
is applicable whether the increased value results from extrinsic
causes, such as a general rise in the market price of the real
estate, or from improvements placed upon the land by the grantee.11
As the court held in the case of Gerbert vs. Congregation of Sons of Abraham, 35 A 1121, there can be no distinction
in principle between the damages recoverable by plaintiff upon a
contract to convey and the damages recoverable upon a covenant
of warranty upon failure of title and ouster.

In that case, the

court held that the vendee was merely entitled to a refund of
monies paid, if any,

-6-

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ASSESSED THE PROPER
MEASURE OF DAMAGES BECAUSE OF THE GOOD FAITH
OF THE RESPONDENTS, ASSUMING THAT THERE WAS
A PROPER TENDER OF THE BALANCE DUE ON THE REAL
ESTATE CONTRACTS.
Respondent is in agreement with that portion of the
Appellant's brief stating that there is a division of authority
as to the appropriate measure of damages when it becomes impossible
for the vendor to convey real property to a purchaser,
brief, page 4.)

(Appellant's

Many jurisdictions make a determination of whether

the vendee is entitled to out-of-pocket loss or benefit of the
bargain depending upon whether there was any bad faith on the part
of the vendor.

The lower court specifically found that the Responden

negotiated the real estate contracts in good faith and acted in good
faith throughout the transaction and that their inability to give
good title is not caused by any of their acts.

(Finding of Fact #8)

It is the Respondent's position that the weight of
authority makes such a distinction and only allows the vendee to
recover the benefit of the bargain when the vendor acted in bad
faith.

See 77 Am Jur 2d 647, Vendor and Purchaser, §519, which

states as follows:
"When, however, the vendor has acted in good faith but
is unable to carry out the contract because of some defect in the
title, recovery by the purchaser for loss of his bargain is denied
by the weight of authority.If
This was published in 1975.
Because of the split of authority and the confusion which
it has caused, some jurisdictions have made the damages distinction
statutory,

The following language appears identically in the

Statutes of California, Montana and Oklahoma:
"The detriment caused by the breach of an agreement to
convey an estate in real property, is deemed to be the price paid,
-7-

and the expenses properly incurred in examining the title and
preparing the necessary papers, with interest thereon; but
adding thereto, in the case of bad faith, the difference between
the price agreed to be paid and the value of the estate agreed to
be conveyed, at the time of the breach and the expenses properly
incurred in preparing to enter upon the land.n California Civil
Code §3306; Revised Code of Montana 1947 §17-306; 23 Okl. St. Ann.
§27.
It does not appear that the reasons for codification
were to change common law, but rather that it was done for
clarification.

As the court held in the case of Shaw v. Union

Escrow and Realty Company, 200 P 25 (1921), at page 27, nTo our
mind the code provisions have added nothing to the law already
established when it is declared that in case only of bad faith
on the part of the vendor, damages may be recovered because of
profits which might have accrued to the purchaser."

The court

was referring to §3306 of the California Civil Code as referred
to above.
Even in those states where there is no statute clarifying
the rule of damages, the weight of authority, as stated above,
is in support of the rule that determines damages on the basis of
the good or bad faith of the vendor.
State of New York.

Among these states is the

See Valley Associates Corp. vs. Rogers, 158

NYS 2d 231; Mokar Properties Corp. vs. Hall, 179 NYS 2d 814;
Spuches vs. Royal View Inc., 202 NYS 2d 51; Montagnino vs. Broj er,
214 NYS 2d 208.
Among the Western States, other than those referred to,
it is often unknown which rule of damages would be applied in this
type of situation, although the States of Washington, Arizona and

-8-

Nevada clearly follow the good faith-bad faith distinction
as far as damages are concerned.

See Parchen vs. Rowley,

82 P2d 857 (1938); Cole vs. Atkins, 209 P2d 859 (1949);
Masani vs. Quilici, 218 P2d 946 (1950), respectively.
The law in Utah is not clear.

The case of Bunnell vs.

Bills, 13 U2d 83, 368, P2d 597 (1962), wherein the court said
that the measure of damages is the market value of the property
at the time of the breach, less the contract price, involved
a factual situation which is distinguishable from the case in
concern and is also a case that would come within the realm of
n

bad faith" on the part of the vendor.

The vendor, who was also

buying on contract, at the time of his contract to sell, did not
have legal title to the property and knew that he did not have
legal title and also must have known that he would never receive
legal title to the property due to his financial situation.

In

the case before this court, the seller, in good faith, believed
that he had legal title which at one time he did, through a tax
deed, and Utah Title Company sustained him in that reasonable
belief by issuing a Preliminary Title Report showing such title
to the property to be in him, jointly with the other Respondents.
Thus, we have a case of first impression in which the damages
rule has not been construed as applied to these types of facts.
The case of Shaw v. Union Escrow and Realty Company,
supra, as referred to by the Appellant in support of the proposition
that negligence is sufficient to satisfy the bad faith requirement,
-9-

involved a case where again there was bad faith in excess of
mere neglect.

In that case, since the knowledge of the agents

of the corporate seller is imputed to the corporation, the
corporation was selling property that had been previously conveyed
to a prior purchaser and the corporation knew of such conveyance.
Clearly, this is not our case.
It must also be remembered that Appellant was also
negligent in failing to discover the presence of an adverse
possessor.

Appellant is bound by the findings of fact entered

in the principal action which are as follows:
"11. That at all times continuously from November 25,
1930, up to and including the present time that the plaintiffs,
or other persons acting with the plaintiffs1 permission or under
the plaintiffs' direction or control have had exclusive, complete,
actual, open, notorious, hostile and continuous undisputed possession of the real property which forms the subject matter of
this lawsuit.Tf
Appellant's actual knowledge of the existence of the
adverse possessors is also evident from the additional facts set
forth in this Respondent's Statement of Facts,

There are several

cases holding that where the buyer knew of the defect in the
seller's title, that upon the failure of the seller to convey
good title, the buyer is limited in damages to those out-of-pocket.
48 ALR 50 (f). Thus, it was held in the case of Garcia vs.
Yvaguirre, 213 SW 236 (1919), that where the vendee knew, at the
time of entering into the contract for the purchase of land, that
the vendor had no title thereto, and there was no fraud upon the
part of the vendor, the vendee can recover only the amount he has
-10-

paid on the contract, if any, and such special damages, not
including the loss of his bargain, as he may allege or prove.
POINT III
EVEN WHERE A VENDEE IS ENTITLED TO THE BENEFIT
OF THE BARGAIN, IT IS DETERMINED BY THE VALUE
OF THE PROPERTY AS OF THE DATE OF THE CONTRACT.
The difficulty with determining the fair market value
of the property, even assuming that the Appellant is entitled to
such, is determining the date to be used in establishing such.
As has been pointed out, the breach actually occurred when the
vendor was unable to deliver possession of the property.

If such

a time were used, then a refund of the purchase price would be
the same amount as paying the fair market value of the property.
(R. 277 & 278)
It is unfortunate that the Appellant did not take or
attempt to take possession of the property at the
contract.

time of the

If he had done so, it would have been discovered that

the property was being adversely possessed and damages could have
been determined at that time before any rise in market value.
Actually the property had been lost by adverse possession prior to
the execution of these real estate contracts.
If the breach did not occur when the vendee was unable
to take possession, then it becomes difficult to determine when it
did occur.
balance.

This is because there never was a tender of the contract

Nevertheless, in some of the jurisdictions which allow

the vendee the benefit of the bargain, it is determined by determining
the market value of the property at the time the contract was
executed.

For example, see Raisor vs. Jackson, 225 SW 2d 647,

where a vendor unconditionally agreed to convey realty knowing he
-11-

had no title and with knowledge of an outstanding interest therein
owned by a third-party and where the vendor breached his agreement
it was held that the purchaser may recover the difference between
the contract price and reasonable market value of realty at time
contract was executed; Montagnino vs. Brojer, supra.
POINT IV
THE LOWER COURT WAS CORRECT IN RULING THAT
THE APPELLANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO COSTS OF
COURT OR ATTORNEY'S FEES.
Since the Respondents agreed to refund the contract
payments, together with interest, there was no need for the crossclaim of the Appellant and therefore attorney's fees in connection
therewith should be denied.

(R. 285). Costs of court should also

be denied for the same reason.

CONCLUSION
The cross-complaint should either be dismissed for
insufficient tender and if not the lower court should be affirmed as
to the measure of damages.

Respectfully submitted,
BACKMAN, CLARK & MARSH
Milton V. Backman
David B. Boyce
Attorneys for Respondent Ehlers
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